

It is a vote of confidence . . . but is not a blank check for policies that might in the future be carried on by the executive branch of the Government without full consultation by the Congress.

Do these speeches sound familiar? They were not about Iraq. They were spoken 38 years ago when I was still a prosecutor in Vermont. At the end of that debate, after statements were made that this resolution is not a blank check, and that Congress will always watch what the Executive Branch is doing, the Senate voted on that resolution. Do you know what the vote was? 88 to 2. It passed overwhelmingly.

In case everyone does not know what resolution I am talking about, I am talking about the Tonkin Gulf resolution. As we know all too well, the Tonkin Gulf resolution was used by both the Johnson and Nixon administrations as *carte blanche* to wage war on Vietnam, ultimately involving more than half a million American troops, resulting in the deaths of more than 58,000 Americans. Yet, even the Tonkin Gulf resolution, unlike the one that we are debating today, had a sunset provision.

When I came to the Senate, there were a lot of Senators, both Republicans and Democrats, who had voted for the Tonkin Gulf resolution. Every single Senator who ever discussed it with me said what a mistake it was to write that kind of blank check on the assurance that we would continue to watch what went on.

I am not suggesting the administration is trying to mislead the Congress about the situation in Iraq, as Congress was misled on the Tonkin Gulf resolution. I am not comparing a possible war in Iraq to the Vietnam war. They are very different countries, with different histories, and with different military capabilities. But the key words in the resolution we are considering today are remarkably similar to the infamous resolution of 38 years ago which so many Senators and so many millions of Americans came to regret.

Let us not make that mistake again. Let us not pass a Tonkin Gulf resolution. Let us not set the history of our great country this way. Let us not make the mistake we made once before.

I yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, late last night in a colloquy between myself and the Senator from Oregon, the Senator from Oregon read into the RECORD portions of a letter addressed to Senator GRAHAM, chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, signed by George Tenet. I ask unanimous consent that that letter be printed in the RECORD today, followed by a statement issued by Mr. Tenet bearing on his interpretation and intent in writing that letter.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,  
Washington, DC, October 7, 2002.

Hon. BOB GRAHAM,  
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,  
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to your letter of 4 October 2002, we have made unclassified material available to further the Senate's forthcoming open debate on a Joint Resolution concerning Iraq.

As always, our declassification efforts seek a balance between your need for unfettered debate and our need to protect sources and methods. We have also been mindful of a shared interest in not providing to Saddam a blueprint of our intelligence capabilities and shortcoming, or with insight into our expectation of how he will and will not act. The salience of such concerns is only heightened by the possibility for hostilities between the U.S. and Iraq.

These are some of the reasons why we did not include our classified judgments on Saddam's decisionmaking regarding the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in our recent unclassified paper on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction. Viewing your request with those concerns in mind, however, we can declassify the following from the paragraphs you requested.

Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States.

Should Saddam conclude that a US-led attack could no longer be deterred, he probably would become much less constrained in adopting terrorist actions. Such terrorism might involve conventional means, as with Iraq's unsuccessful attempt at a terrorist offensive in 1991, or CBW.

Saddam might decide that the extreme step of assisting Islamist terrorists in conducting a WMD attack against the United States would be his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him.

Regarding the 2 October closed hearing, we can declassify the following dialogue.

Senator Levin: . . . If (Saddam) didn't feel threatened, did not feel threatened, is it likely that he would initiate an attack using a weapon of mass destruction?

Senior Intelligence Witness: . . . My judgment would be that the probability of him initiating an attack—let me put a time frame on it—in the foreseeable future, given the conditions we understand now, the likelihood I think would be low.

Senator LEVIN: Now if he did initiate an attack you've . . . indicated he would probably attempt clandestine attacks against us . . . But what about his use of weapons of mass destruction? If we initiate an attack and he thought he was in extremis or otherwise, what's the likelihood in response to our attack that he would use chemical or biological weapons?

Senior Intelligence Witness: Pretty high, in my view.

In the above dialogue, the witness's qualifications—"in the foreseeable future, given the conditions we understand now"—were intended to underscore that the likelihood of Saddam using WMD for blackmail, deterrence, or otherwise grows as his arsenal builds. Moreover, if Saddam used WMD, it would disprove his repeated denials that he has such weapons.

Regarding Senator Bayh's question of Iraqi links to al-Qa'ida, Senators could draw from the following points for unclassified discussions:

Our understanding of the relationship between Iraq and al-Qa'ida is evolving and is based on sources of varying reliability. Some of the information we have received comes from detainees, including some of high rank.

We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and al-Qa'ida going back a decade.

Credible information indicates that Iraq and al-Qa'ida have discussed safe haven and reciprocal non-aggression.

Since Operation Enduring Freedom, we have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of al-Qa'ida members, including some that have been in Baghdad.

We have credible reporting that al-Qa'ida leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire WMD capabilities. The reporting also stated that Iraq has provided training to al-Qa'ida members in the areas of poisons and gases and making conventional bombs.

Iraq's increasing support to extremist Palestinians, coupled with growing indications of a relationship with al-Qa'ida, suggest that Baghdad's links to terrorists will increase, even absent US military action.

Sincerely,

JOHN MCLAUGHLIN  
(For George J. Tenet, Director).

STATEMENT BY DCI GEORGE TENET, October 8, 2002

There is no inconsistency between our view of Saddam's growing threat and the view as expressed by the President in his speech. Although we think the chances of Saddam initiating a WMD attack at this moment are low—in part because it would constitute an admission that he possesses WMD—there is no question that the likelihood of Saddam using WMD against the United States or our allies in the region for blackmail, deterrence, or otherwise grows as his arsenal continues to build. His past use of WMD against civilian and military targets shows that he produces those weapons to use not just to deter.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa is recognized for 20 minutes.

Mr. GRASSLEY. Madam President, before I give my reasons for my vote on this resolution, I would like to point out some ironies and inconsistencies in some positions of some of my colleagues.

It is not unusual for Senators to be inconsistent in positions taken, but in recent weeks we have had some colleagues blaming the administration for not responding to the pre-9/11 warnings of possible terrorist attacks on the United States. I am talking about the warnings of whether or not the CIA and the FBI had information about that and whether or not the President had access to that information. The insinuation is that maybe the President knew more than what he did and, why didn't he do something about 9/11?

It seems to me the same colleagues are now refusing to support the President's call to disarm Saddam Hussein. The President is trying to preempt Saddam Hussein from unleashing on Americans his weapons of mass destruction. Yet my colleagues who are inconsistent in this way apparently want the President to wait until we are attacked again. I ask, if you were expecting preemption before September 11, 2001, why wouldn't you expect the President to preempt an attack on the United States today?